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Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of the Judicial Function
Martin H. Redisht
The federal courts have long assumed the authority to decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction explicitly vested in them by Congress. The courts have
also assumed that they may decline to enforce certain substantive federal
rights, usually those protecting individual civil liberties against state inva-
sion. These presumptions of authority are manifested in the various "ab-
stention" doctrines, developed by the federal courts largely within the last
fifty years.' While the abstention doctrines have most often been applied
in cases invoking only the federal courts' civil rights jurisdiction, in certain
instances they sweep both civil rights and other forms of jurisdiction
within their reach.2 In still other cases, they have been applied to exercises
of federal jurisdiction wholly devoid of civil rights concerns, such as
diversity.'
The federal courts have assumed this authority, even in the absence of
legislative history or statutory language authorizing such a refusal to act.
Surprisingly, few have questioned whether the federal judiciary's author-
ity to take such action violates the separation of governmental powers. To
be sure, both scholars and jurists have criticized the efficacy and wisdom
of the various abstention doctrines." But they have left largely untouched
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the important question of the federal judiciary's authority to ignore the
dictates of valid jurisdictional and civil rights statutes.5
Presumably no one would deny that a federal court cannot legitimately
invalidate a federal statute solely because of its unwise policies, or because
it would make judges work harder than they believe they should, or be-
cause the judges themselves would not have enacted such legislation. Such
behavior by the judiciary would amount to a blatant-and indefen-
sible-usurpation of legislative authority. At most, the judiciary possesses
authority to overturn federal legislation because it is unconstitutional,6 not
because the judiciary considers it unwise. Yet, in a sense, the abstention
doctrines amount to such usurpation.
The questionable logic underlying traditional abstention has been taken
to an extreme in recent years by members of the judiciary who argue that
state court adjudication of federal rights against the states is generally to
be preferred to federal court adjudication.' These "total abstention" theo-
ries would effectively prohibit the federal courts from enforcing federal
civil rights laws, in particular section 1983,8 and from exercising their
congressionally-vested jurisdiction to enforce those laws." The term "total
abstention" may be technically inaccurate, for these theories usually pur-
port to preserve some jurisdiction for the federal courts to exercise. 0 But
as a practical matter, the abstention is total, and this seems to be the goal
of the theories' supporters.
5. This is true of all of my previous writing, which has questioned various judge-made abstention
doctrines solely on the basis of policy considerations. E.g., Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris:
Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463 (1978). At least one commentator has
persuasively questioned the viability of the judge-made equitable abstention doctrine of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), by examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). See Zeigler, A Reassessment of the
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987. How-
ever, to date no commentator has undertaken a structural separation-of-powers analysis of the entire
range of judge-made abstention.
6. Indeed, the extent to which the courts can do even this has been the subject of recent vigorous
debate. Compare M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) with
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980).
7. Justice Rehnquist is the foremost advocate of this view, although Chief Justice Burger is of the
same school. See discussion infra pp. 105-10.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ...
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (1982), provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . ...
10. See discussion infra pp. 105-10.
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The burden of production in the abstention debate has been improperly
reversed. The primary battleground has generally concerned the debate
over whether state courts could protect federal rights as effectively as fed-
eral courts. Those who argue for either the adoption of "total abstention"
or for the continuation or expansion of existing "partial abstention" raise
various arguments founded in either social policy,11 federalism," or judi-
cial efficiency. 3 They usually develop their arguments as if we were at-
tempting to establish, on a totally clean slate, the wisest system of judicial
federalism, in total disregard of the detailed and carefully balanced ex-
isting statutory network. Even more surprising, perhaps, is that many
who oppose this argument have been willing to approach the problem on
these terms, constantly seeking to demonstrate that federal courts are in
fact superior to state courts as enforcers of federal rights.1 4 In my opinion,
the arguments that federal courts are superior are overwhelming.1 5 But
that should not be the point of contention, nor is it the point of this
Article.
The central difficulty with the argument for abstention is the forum to
which it has been directed. Nothing, of course, prevents those who believe
in the fungibility of state and federal courts as protectors of federal rights
11. See discussion infra pp. 111-12.
12. See discussion infra pp. 88-95.
13. See discussion infra pp. 96-97.
14. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 4; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105
(1977); Redish, supra note 5.
15. These arguments are the following:
[T]he dramatic changes in the philosophy of federalism, culminating in the Civil War and
enactment of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments and statutes limiting state power
to interfere with federal rights, dictated a corresponding shift in the balance of judicial power
between state and federal courts. Post-Civil War Congresses expressed grave mistrust of state
court willingness to protect federal rights and to further federal interests. While of course state
court ability or willingness to protect federal rights cannot be absolutely measured by the
realities present over a hundred years ago, the changes in federal jurisdiction introduced at that
time have had a far-reaching effect, both practically and philosophically, on the relative capa-
bilities of state and federal courts in the modem federal system. Since that time federal courts
have developed a vast expertise in dealing with the intricacies of federal law, while the state
judiciary has, quite naturally, devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and refinement of
state law and policy. It would be unreasonable to expect state judiciaries to possess a facility
equal to that of the federal courts in adjudicating federal law. Moreover, because federal
judges are guaranteed the independence protections of Article III, while many state judges are
forced to stand for election, we can generally be assured of a greater degree of independence of
the federal judiciary from external political forces. When the issue is which court system is
better able to protect minority rights from majoritarian infringement, this is not an insignifi-
cant factor. Finally, because of the process of presidential selection and Senate confirmation,
we can usually be assured of a floor of competence on the federal judiciary.
M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). See also Redish, supra note 5 (suggesting
superiority of federal courts as protectors of federal rights). In one earlier piece, I argued that because
state courts lack the independence protections of Article III, they do not meet the requirements of the
due process clause in cases challenging the constitutionality of state action. Redish, Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager,
77 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 161-66 (1982).
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from attempting to convince Congress to repeal or substantially modify
the broad jurisdiction it has vested in the federal courts. Generally, how-
ever, the arguments have not been directed to the legislative arena, but
instead to the judicial forum, which is somehow believed to possess au-
thority to alter or overrule the legislative directives.
Democratic principles clearly prohibit the judiciary from effectively re-
pealing the statutory structure through "total abstention." It is doubtful
that the "partial abstention" model is substantially more consistent with
American political theory. One could persuasively argue that whatever so-
cial harms may flow from federal judicial enforcement of federal rights
against state entities cannot-short of a finding of unconstitutional-
ity-justify judicial abandonment of federal legislation. Even if we were to
accept that, in extreme cases, the judiciary may create "safety valve" ex-
ceptions to otherwise unlimited legislation, the focus of the policy argu-
ment does not become whether state courts could do as good a job as fed-
eral courts; Congress has left the resolution of this issue to the plaintiff's
choice of forum." If it is to be employed at all, a safety valve should be
recognized only in narrowly defined circumstances where state interests
are so overwhelmingly undermined by federal, rather than state, adjudica-
tion that Congress could not possibly have contemplated or desired such a
result. Thus refocused, the policy debate-to the extent that the separa-
tion-of-powers principle is construed to allow the courts to engage in such
a debate-becomes whether federal adjudication would have a truly cata-
strophic effect on state interests. The only way that question can be an-
swered is by examining how the world of judicial federalism would func-
tion if all forms of judge-made abstention were simultaneously to
disappear.
This Article argues that neither total nor partial judge-made abstention
is acceptable as a matter of legal process and separation of powers,
wholly apart from the practical advisability of either form of the
doctrine. Moreover, it suggests that the high transaction costs imposed
by most forms of these abstention doctrines are not justified by their
supposed benefits,"1 and that their total abolition would not seriously
undermine the efficient workings of judicial federalism. It concludes
that the interests of federalism would be sufficiently protected by
existing statutorily-dictated abstention,"8 by long established equitable
16. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967): "In thus expanding federal judicial power,
Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's
choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims."
17. See discussion infra pp. 91-98.
18. Such statutorily-dictated abstention is found in the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982); the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); the Johnson Act of 1934, 28
U.S.C. § 1342 (1982); the since-modified Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982); and the
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limitations,19 and by the contours and limits of the substantive federal
rights being enforced." Thus, little would be lost and much gained by
simple judicial adherence to the valid legislative commands of existing fed-
eral substantive and jurisdictional enactments. Even if we were to con-
clude that unwavering judicial enforcement of this legislation actually
would cause serious social harm, the recourse certainly should not be to
the equivalent of judicial civil disobedience, but rather to the democrati-
cally ordained legislative process.
I. THE PARTIAL ABSTENTION MODEL AS A JUDICIAL USURPATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The various forms of partial abstention " arise regularly in federal liti-
gation, primarily (although not exclusively) in cases under the federal civil
rights jurisdiction. Perhaps the best known type is so-called Pullman ab-
stention, developed in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman," under
which a federal court will delay the exercise of its jurisdiction to allow a
state court to interpret an ambiguous state statute subjected to a constitu-
tional challenge. The doctrine is invoked only when the challenged statute
is capable of at least two constructions, one which would render the law
unconstitutional and one which would not. The case may ultimately re-
turn to the federal court for adjudication of the constitutional claim,2" but
only after the state courts have definitively interpreted the statute. 4
The Younger v. Harris25 abstention doctrine provides that a federal
court may not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding, even to protect
federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has also applied the doc-
trine to the issuance of declaratory relief" and to certain state civil pro-
ceedings that implicate important state concerns. 7
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,28 the Supreme Court ordered abstention in
exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). See discussion infra pp.
81-82.
19. By this I refer to non-federalism based limitations on the grant of equitable relief. See discus-
sion infra pp. 85-86.
20. See discussion infra p. 93.
21. Because the various forms of abstention have been described in detail elsewhere, this section
will provide only their essential elements. For more detailed analysis, see the sources cited supra note
1.
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
23. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
24. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 255-58.
25. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
26. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (state interest in preventing wel-
fare fraud); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (state contempt power).
28. 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943). See also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S.
341, 349-50 (1951) (federal court will abstain in suit challenging constitutionality of commission
order requiring railroad to continue in operation).
The Yale Law Journal
order to prevent federal judicial interference in complex state administra-
tive schemes. The Court also found abstention appropriate in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,29 a case concerning the validity
of state expropriation of property. Although the presence of a parallel
proceeding in a state court generally does not justify the dismissal of a
federal suit, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States0 the Court held that "exceptional" circumstances may justify a
stay. Finally, in Parratt v. Taylor,31 the Court interpreted the due process
clause to be satisfied by the provision of a state tort remedy for certain
constitutional violations by state officers. While this decision purports to
represent constitutional interpretation, in fact it amounts to a form of ju-
risdictional abstention."2
Each of these variants of the partial abstention model could be charac-
terized as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the
principle of separation of powers. The principle of separation of powers
between the judicial and legislative branches derives from the fundamental
democratic principle of electoral accountability." The separation-of-
powers critique of the partial abstention model begins with an analysis of
the judiciary's proper role in a democratic society. The essential element
of any democratic society is at least some level of majoritarian self-
determination. 4 In our form of constitutional democracy, we have chosen
to vest in a largely unrepresentative judiciary the power to invalidate laws
adopted by a majoritarian legislature when those laws are deemed to vio-
late constitutional protections.35 It has never been suggested, however, that
the judiciary may openly ignore a legislative judgment on any grounds
other than unconstitutionality. Though the Supreme Court has reiterated
this reasoning on a number of occasions, 8 its statement in TVA v. Hill37
describes the principle as well as any:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each
branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Consti-
29. 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959).
30. 424 U.S. 800, 818-20 (1976).
31. 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981).
32. See discussion infra pp. 98-101.
33. See Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. (1985)
(forthcoming).
34. As Professor Peter Bachrach has stated, "[diemocratic participation. . . is a process in which
persons formulate, discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and directly affect
their lives." Bachrach, Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory, in PARTIcIPATION IN PoLrr-
Ics: NoMos XVI 39, 41 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975).
35. This has been accepted at least since the decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803).
36. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979).
37. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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tution. While "[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is," . . it is equally-and em-
phatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to
formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but
also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Con-
gress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of pri-
orities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws
and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.38
Thus, Congress, exercising its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 9 has established a network of federally protected substantive
rights and simultaneously vested the federal courts with jurisdiction to en-
force those laws, and the Supreme Court lacks the authority to ignore or
invalidate those statutes merely because of disagreement with their sub-
stance. Viewed in the light of the separation-of-powers principle, then,
virtually all the debate over the relative competence of federal and state
courts as enforcers of federal rights becomes logically irrelevant, except to
the extent it is directed exclusively to a call for legislative revision.
Conceptually, at least as a prima facie matter, there is little difference
in this context between total and partial abstention. If Congress intended
that the federal courts exercise a particular jurisdiction, either to achieve
substantive legislative ends or to provide a constitutionally-contemplated
jurisdictional advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections,
repeal those jurisdictional grants. But one may question why, if the courts
do not possess the institutional authority to repeal the legislature's juris-
dictional scheme, they possess any greater authority to modify the scheme
in a manner not contemplated by the legislative body. In either repealing
or modifying the legislation, the court would be altering a legislative
scheme because of disagreement with the social policy choices that the
scheme manifests. Thus, if a judge-made form of partial abstention is in-
consistent with congressional intent to leave federal court jurisdiction un-
limited, the fact that the abstention leaves intact a portion of the jurisdic-
tional grant will not insulate it from a separation-of-powers attack.40
The foundation of the separation-of-powers critique is the assumption
that judge-made partial abstention conflicts with congressional goals em-
38. Id. at 194, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
39. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
40. By way of analogy, if Congress enacted a substantive federal right of libel and slander in
interstate commerce, a federal court would violate separation of powers if it ignored the legislatively
dictated jurisdiction to enforce the statute simply because the court disagreed with its merits. The
court would depart no less from accepted institutional norms if it were instead to "modify" the statute
by ignoring the cause of action for slander and enforcing only the cause of action for libel. While such
judicial action leaves intact a portion of the congressional scheme, the decision to ignore another por-
tion of that scheme clearly usurps legislative authority.
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bodied in the seemingly unlimited grants of jurisdiction. It is the validity
of this assumption that arguably separates the total and partial abstention
models as departures from separation-of-powers principles. Various mod-
els of implied congressional authorization may be employed to justify par-
tial abstention, but they are incapable of supporting total abstention.
While it is at least conceivable that Congress would implicitly delegate to
the judiciary the authority to modify or limit a substantive statutory right
or a jurisdictional grant,"1 it is absurd to imagine that Congress would
implicitly grant the courts authority effectively to repeal such legislation.
The exercise of such authority would render pointless the entire legislative
process.
The fact that Congress theoretically could delegate to the courts the
power to modify otherwise unlimited legislation, however, does not mean
that Congress has actually done so. It is this improper leap from theoreti-
cal possibility to assumed fact that ultimately undermines any defense of
the partial abstention model from a separation-of-powers attack. At the
very least, the separation-of-powers principle should be deemed to impose
a heavy burden of proof on one who would assert that a legislative body
implicitly intended to allow the judiciary to amend unlimited legislation.42
There is no reasonable basis, in terms of either democratic theory or the
realities of the legislative process, for reversing the presumption and con-
cluding that the partial abstention model should fall only if an affirmative
case can be made that Congress did not intend such a power to be exer-
cised. When a legislative body enacts legislation, one must assume, absent
strong countervailing evidence, that that body intended the courts to per-
form neither more nor less than their traditional function in a constitu-
tional democracy-to interpret the language and intent of the statute, to
41. One might argue that even if such a delegation had been clearly intended, it would violate the
principle of separation of powers, since it would amount to an abdication of authority by the represen-
tative branches of government.
42. For example, in the face of silence in the legislative history, the Court will not infer a congres-
sional intent to allow the federal judiciary to develop a private cause of action not expressly authorized
in the statute. In making a determination of whether to infer a private cause of action in the face of
congressional silence, the courts must examine, inter alia, whether "there [is] any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one" and whether such an
inference is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff. . . ." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Court has stated that in making
this determination, "our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the
private right of action.. . . And as with any case involving the interpretation of a statute, our analysis
must begin with the language of the statute itself." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
568 (1979). In California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), holding that § 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 did not imply a private cause of action, the Court noted that
"there is no 'indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one"' (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78) and therefore that "[tihis silence on the remedy
question serves to confirm that in enacting the Act, Congress was concerned not with private rights
but with the Federal Government's ability to respond to obstructions on navigable waterways." 451
U.S. at 295-96 (footnote omitted).
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enforce it as so construed, and to invalidate or ignore it only when they
find that the law is unconstitutional. While there exist several conceivable
separation-of-powers defenses for some or all elements of the partial ab-
stention model, all of which derive ultimately from some concept of im-
plied legislative authorization, none of them meets the heavy burden of
proof that the separation-of-powers principle demands.
II. DEFENSES OF THE PARTIAL ABSTENTION MODEL
Before detailing and critiquing the conceivable justifications for partial
abstention, it is important to clarify the distinctions among the variations
of the model. Two forms of partial abstention, Pullman and Younger,4
are limited in their application to cases involving a federal constitutional
challenge to state action. But beyond this link, these two variants differ in
several respects. Most important for a separation-of-powers analysis is
that Pullman abstention, unlike Younger abstention, does not preclude the
exercise of lower federal court jurisdiction; it merely delays it. 4 For this
reason, Pullman abstention might be deemed less of a judicial undermin-
ing of the congressional jurisdictional structure. On the other hand, since
the Court has traditionally limited Younger to situations in which a fed-
eral court is asked to disrupt an ongoing state judicial proceeding, 5 this
form of abstention may arguably be justified by the long tradition of con-
gressional disdain for federal court disruption of state judicial proceed-
ings,4 a justification not available for Pullman abstention. Some forms of
partial abstention, such as Colorado River abstention for parallel state
proceedings, may apply to any type of federal jurisdiction, while still
others apply only to the diversity grant.
Although advocates of partial abstention have not attempted to catego-
rize and synthesize the defenses of partial abstention, that task is an im-
portant one. Certain conceivable justifications are limited to a particular
43. See discussion infra pp. 91-95.
44. Pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), the
federal court may reserve jurisdiction, and decide the federal issue once the state courts have defini-
tively interpreted the state law. However, several commentators have urged that Pullman abstention
be modified so that the entire case could be shifted to the state court, instead of returning to the
federal court for an adjudication of the federal issue after the state court has decided the meaning of
the state law. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 49, 285-86 (1969) (proposed statutory rejection of Eng-
land); Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doc-
trine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1959) (urging that state court be allowed to decide both federal and state
questions).
45. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461 (1974).
46. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (prohibiting injunctions against state court proceedings
except when authorized by Act of Congress or necessary to aid federal court's jurisdiction or enforce-
ment of judgments); Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 717
(1977) (examining decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)).
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form of abstention, while others may apply to all forms. One category of
arguments has been used to justify one or more of the forms of partial
abstention in cases presenting a constitutional challenge to state action.
This category includes (1) the general implied delegation argument (em-
ployed to justify any and all forms of partial abstention in such cases); (2)
the argument from equity (a specific subset of an implied delegation ra-
tionale); and (3) the non-preclusive nature of Pullman abstention.
A fourth justification, which I label the "safety valve" rationale, could
conceivably apply to any form of partial abstention, though it soon be-
comes clear that the argument provides stronger support for some forms
than for others. Simply put, this justification-also a variant of an implied
delegation rationale-posits that Congress could not possibly have in-
tended the catastrophic social and political effects that would result if par-
tial abstention were not employed. In one case, Parratt v. Taylor, a sub-
stantive constitutional analysis was applied to justify what was ultimately
a jurisdictional decision. Finally, there is the general implied delegation
rationale applied specifically in the diversity context. While the institu-
tional arguments about finding an implied delegation in this context are
the same as in the case of civil rights jurisdiction, the practical differences
are so substantial that I have chosen to distinguish this specific use of the
implied delegation rationale from its application to the civil rights context.
Ultimately, none of these rationales successfully defends the partial ab-
stention model against a separation-of-powers attack. As the following
discussion will demonstrate, no rationale overcomes the strong presump-
tion against the concept of implied delegation.
A. The Inplied Delegation Rationale in Constitutional Challenges to
State Action
One might argue that federal court jurisdiction to enforce federal consti-
tutional rights contains an implied authority to modify or limit the exer-
cise of that jurisdiction in order to avoid friction within the federal system.
Congress cannot foresee all conceivable federalism tensions that might
arise in specific exercises of federal jurisdiction, the argument would pro-
ceed, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that Congress would allow
the federal courts to modify or limit their jurisdiction when they find such
dangers. It is indeed not uncommon for Congress to provide broad delega-
tions of authority to the federal judiciary to make law. In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,47 for example, the Supreme Court held that what
seemed to be merely a broad jurisdictional statute4 ' vested in the federal
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
48. The relevant statute was § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120,
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courts the power to develop-wholly without congressional guidance-a
substantive federal common law of labor relations. Similarly, the broad
language of section 1 of the Sherman Act49 has been construed as an effec-
tive delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary to develop a com-
mon law of restraint of trade.50 Moreover, the implied delegation argu-
ment asserts, if Congress were unhappy with any existing form of partial
abstention, it would legislatively revoke it. The failure to do so, combined
with reenactment of the relevant substantive and jurisdictional legisla-
tion,"1 the argument posits, reveals an implicit congressional acceptance
and ratification of such judge-made limitations.
This argument fails for several reasons. In light of the long history of
congressional interest in the tensions of judicial federalism, the basic pre-
mise of implied delegation is dubious. Since the nation's beginning, Con-
gress has statutorily dictated federal court abstention whenever it has
found federal judicial action to present a danger to the federal system.
The Anti-Injunction Act,52 the Three-Judge Court Act,53 the statutory
branch of the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, 54 the Tax Injunction
Act," and the Johnson Act56 constitute a statutory network of legislatively
directed limitations on the exercise of federal court power to disrupt state
proceedings or interfere unduly with state policies.
It is true that the existence of this program of statutorily dictated ab-
stention does not necessarily preclude Congress from vesting in the federal
judiciary the authority to extend abstention beyond these legislative limita-
tions. But it does establish that federal court abstention is not an area in
which Congress has traditionally deferred to judicial discretion: Congress
has long manifested concern with the issue, ordering abstention when it
deemed abstention appropriate.
More importantly, the general implied delegation argument suffers
from a fatal lack of evidentiary support. No supporter of partial absten-
tion has pointed to anything approaching hard evidence in the legislative
61 Stat. 136, 156 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . .. ."
50. See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-62 (1911); Northern Sec. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 404 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (It is "perfectly clear" that Congress "expected the
courts to give shape to . . . [the Sherman Act's] broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.").
51. The most recent recodification came in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 932.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
The Yale Law Journal
history of either the original enactment or the more recent reenactments of
the substantive and jurisdictional civil rights statutes which suggests that
Congress intended that the federal courts possess authority to modify or
limit otherwise unlimited legislation. This failure is not surprising, since
there were virtually no references made, in either the debates or commit-
tee reports of the 1948 revision of the judicial code, to the scope of juris-
diction under section 1343.5"
It is true that Congress has never overruled any judge-made form of
abstention, but the argument that a legislative failure to reverse judicial
action necessarily implies tacit legislative authorization for that practice is
neither theoretically legitimate nor practically realistic. On a theoretical
level, it is improper to transform a congressional failure to legislate into
the equivalent of legislation. Before legislation is enacted, it must proceed
through a detailed and rigorous substantive inquiry, investigation, debate,
and formal review in both houses of Congress. This process is, in large
part, mandated by the Constitution. The same cannot be said of a failure
to legislate.
Moreover, reliance on a congressional failure to overrule a limiting
judge-made doctrine, even in a recodification, effectively condones through
legislative inertia what was initially an improper and unauthorized judi-
cial usurpation of legislative authority. This breach of separation of pow-
ers is thus improperly bootstrapped into the status of legislation. Such an
approach, which effectively rewards past and encourages future judicial
encroachments upon the legislative province, must be rejected. If Congress
intends to condone such judicial action, it should be required to say so
expressly in the recodification. At the very least, one should require a
clear showing in the legislative history of congressional awareness and ac-
ceptance of the judicial action. No such evidence has been cited for the
forms of partial abstention.5"
57. The House report made only brief reference to § 1343, and the Senate report made no refer-
ence to it. H.R. RFP. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. I, A121 (1947); S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1948).
58. It is in part on this basis that the decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), may be distinguished from my separation-of-powers critique of judge-
made abstention. In Merrill Lynch, the Court inferred a private cause of action from the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which was silent on the question. The Court noted that:
[pirior to the comprehensive amendments to the CEA enacted in 1974, the federal courts rou-
tinely and consistently had recognized an implied private cause of action on behalf of plaintiffs
seeking to enforce and to collect damages for violation of provisions of the CEA on rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute .... [T]he fact that a comprehensive reex-
amination and significant amendment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under
which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirma-
tively intended to preserve that remedy.
456 U.S. at 353, 381-82 (footnotes omitted). Thus, at least in part, the Court based its finding of an
implied private cause of action on Congress' failure to revoke the judicially recognized cause of action.
If this were the only evidence available to the Court, I would have to reject its analysis as a violation
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On a more practical level, as my colleague Thomas Merrill has argued:
The argument based on the possibility of congressional override ig-
nores the institutional reality that, given its crowded agenda, Con-
gress is far more likely not to act than to act with respect to any
particular issue presented for its attention. Thus, the theoretical pos-
sibility of congressional override cannot disguise the fact that law-
making by federal courts would in most cases result in the federal
courts, rather than Congress, having the last say. In practice, there-
fore, institutionalization of the practice of lawmaking by federal
courts would represent a major shift in policymaking power away
from Congress toward the federal judiciary-in violation of the con-
stitutional scheme. 59
Ironically, one of the best known of the Supreme Court's opinions ex-
pressing a separation-of-powers concern about federal judicial lawmaking
was written by a staunch advocate of judge-made abstention, Justice
Rehnquist. In Milwaukee v. Illinois," he wrote:
Nothing in this process [of formulating federal common law] sug-
gests that courts are better suited to develop national policy in areas
governed by federal common law than they are in other areas, or
that the usual and important concerns of an appropriate division of
functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are
inapplicable.8 1
Although the Court in general and Justice Rehnquist in particular have
expressed serious concern about federal judicial encroachment upon the
legislative province by the creation of federal common law and have been
hesitant to find an implied congressional delegation of lawmaking
of separation of powers. However, the Court also referred to various direct congressional actions and
to specific legislative history manifesting congressional awareness of-and desire not to alter-the
judicially recognized private cause of action. Such evidence, never cited in support of judge-made
abstention, at least presents a closer question in terms of separation of powers. Moreover, the two
situations can also be distinguished because the private cause of action recognized in Merrill Lynch
could only strengthen the congressional scheme to prevent violations of the CEA. Judge-made absten-
tion, on the other hand, can serve only to undermine achievement of Congress' goals. This factor alone
may legitimately dictate the need for a considerably stronger showing of legislative acquiescence before
the judiciary should be deemed authorized to depart from the explicit statutory structure.
In any event, it is worthy of note that Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor-generally the leading advocates of judge-made abstention-dissented in Merrill Lynch.
Justice Powell's dissent, in which the others joined, argued that the majority's "theory is incompatible
with our constitutional separation of powers, and in my view it is without support in logic or in law."
456 U.S. at 395. If the four Justices applied the same rigorous analysis to the issue of judge-made
abstention, they would be required to alter drastically their support of such judicial power.
59. Merrill, supra note 33, at 28 (footnotes omitted).
60. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
61. Id. at 313.
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power,62 neither has seen precisely the same dangers inherent in the de-
velopment of judge-made abstention.
To the extent that there are differences between judge-made abstention
and judicial creation of federal common law, the former will usually con-
stitute a greater departure from accepted separation-of-powers principles.
To be sure, when a federal court provides a private cause of action for a
legislative violation where Congress has intended no such result, there are
arguably serious separation-of-powers problems raised. But a far greater
judicial encroachment upon the legislative prerogative takes place when
the federal courts directly undermine enforcement of an existing legislative
program by declining to enforce federal rights in situations not authorized
by Congress. Judge-made abstention, then, constitutes judicial lawmaking
of the most sweeping nature. The principle of separation of powers would
be better protected by the Court's application of the same cautious scru-
tiny used to review the creation of federal common law to the development
of judge-made abstention.
Professor Bator contends that "[t]he Supreme Court has, quite cor-
rectly, always taken the position that the post-Civil War jurisdictional and
remedial statutes, with their generative language and their complex and
multifaceted legislative histories, are essentially open-textured, leaving
much to interpretation in light of contexts and postulates not always visi-
ble on their surface." 3 Bator's view is both puzzling and vague. Why
should these jurisdictional and remedial statutes be deemed any more
"open-textured" than any other? The language of the relevant statutes
leaves no room for judicial limitation or modification-certainly no more
so than the language of other jurisdictional statutes.14 Moreover, the very
purpose of this legislation was to interpose the federal judiciary between
the state and individual, largely because of concern about the functioning
of state judiciaries.65 If an implied delegation argument is to survive a
separation-of-powers challenge, then it must have a firmer basis in fact
than Professor Bator has provided.
B. The Argument from Equity
An implied delegation argument based on equity has been suggested as
justification for both Younger and Pullman abstention. However, the ar-
gument fails to support either.
In one of the rare instances in which a supporter of judge-made absten-
62. See supra notes 42, 58.
63. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
605, 622 n.49 (1981).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
65. See sources cited supra note 5.
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tion has even acknowledged the possibility of a separation-of-powers prob-
lem, Professor Bator argued that development of such abstention
is the correct enterprise not only because this is institutionally the
"correct" or "best" solution, but also because it seems to me to be the
proper interpretation of the governing authoritative statutes ...
Statutes such as § 1983 and the Habeas Corpus Act use language
which, if woodenly and anachronistically read, can be interpreted to
provide an "absolute" right of access to the federal courts. But these
statutes were themselves passed against the background of a large
body of standing law on matters of substance, remedy, and jurisdic-
tion. . . . The fact that a given remedial doctrine is not explicitly
mentioned therefore does not automatically mean that the new stat-
ute was intended wholly to supersede it. Thus, to give an example, it
seems to me implausible to assume that the cause of action created
by and the jurisdiction granted in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 were
meant wholly to supersede the preexisting equity doctrine that a
good faith criminal prosecution will not ordinarily be enjoined sim-
ply because the plaintiff asserts that he has a valid defense to it."8
This is a form of an implied delegation argument, but it is, in theory at
least, a considerably more disciplined and defensible one than the general
implied delegation theory. Section 1983 provides that culpable defendants
"shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress."187 Thus, the statute presumably in-
corporates preexisting limitations on the use of equitable power. One
could plausibly argue that Younger abstention accords with legislative will
because equity would not traditionally enjoin a good-faith criminal prose-
cution where the defendant had an adequate remedy at law.
There are problems with Professor Bator's analysis, however. The ac-
cepted limitation on equitable relief against a criminal prosecution derived
from an English unitary system, and therefore the limit on federal equita-
ble power, was traditionally confined to prosecutions in the federal
courts."' The principle did not extend to preclude federal interference
66. Bator, supra note 63, at 622 n.49.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
68. Professor Bator's earlier work acknowledged this fact. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1009
(2d ed. 1973). See also Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits ofJudicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591, 637-38
(1975) (criticizing use of English equity principles in the federal courts).
Justice Black also conceded this limitation. After acknowledging the equitable basis for the doctrine
of federal court restraint, he noted that "[t]he doctrine may originally have grown out of circumstances
peculiar to the English judicial system and not applicable in this country. . . ." Younger, 401 U.S.
at 44. It is true that he completed the sentence by stating, "but its fundamental purpose of restraining
equity jurisdiction within narrow limits is equally important under our Constitution, in order to
prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions
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with state court proceedings. In light of this, it is unreasonable to impute
to the enacting Congress the understanding that the equitable relief that
they were providing would not be used against ongoing state prosecutions.
Moreover, because the drafters of section 1983 were especially concerned
with the good faith of the state courts, it is unlikely that they assumed that
the ability to raise a federal defense in state court constituted an adequate
remedy.
The assertion that the statutory provision of equitable relief incorpo-
rates traditional equitable limitations logically implies that a federal court
may decline to issue a preliminary injunction if it fails to find a likelihood
of success on the merits or may deny permanent injunctive relief if a dam-
age remedy adequately protects the plaintiff's interests. But it does not
follow that a federal court may appropriately decline to award equitable
relief on grounds unrelated to traditional equitable concepts. Younger ab-
stention is based more on considerations of comity and federalism than on
traditional grounds of equity.69 Because these considerations represent
merely the Supreme Court's social judgment about the relative competence
of state and federal courts or about the harm caused by federal review of
state policies, they are illegitimate judicial incursions into an area where
Congress has already spoken.
The Anti-Injunction Act7" complicates the equity argument employed
to justify Younger abstention. That statute provides: "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where neces-
sary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." A
federal court may not enjoin a state proceeding unless the injunction falls
within one of the three exceptions. The statute does not, however, resolve
the separation-of-powers problems posed by Younger, and the Court's ex-
press analysis in Younger demonstrates that it did not rely on the Act.
In Younger, the Court found the injunction improper, purely as a mat-
ter of judge-made principles. It expressly declined to consider whether the
injunction was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. One year later in
Mitchum v. Foster,7 1 the Court, in a highly questionable opinion, 2 found
that section 1983 constituted an implied yet "expressly authorized" con-
where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted." Id. However, such a response
fails to consider the issue from the perspective and understanding of the Congress that originally
authorized equitable relief for violations of federal rights.
69. See Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L.
REv. 1141, 1189 (1977) ("The systemic emphasis of the Younger doctrine deletes the individual con-
cern of equity from the calculus.").
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
71. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
72. In another article I have argued that the Mitchum analysis is illogical and inconsistent with
both Younger and the statutory language. Redish, supra note 46, at 733-39.
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gressional exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. It nevertheless continued
to adhere to the terms of Younger's judge-made abstention doctrine.73 In
what may be one of the most bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analy-
sis, the Court in Mitchum found section 1983 to be an "implied" express
exception (an oxymoron if ever there was one) because of the grave mis-
trust of the state judiciaries expressed by the drafters of the statute.7 4 Yet
Younger rests largely on the desire to avoid insulting state judiciaries by
questioning their competence or good faith.75
One could reasonably reject Mitchum as a poorly reasoned construction
of the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
Younger abstention, at least to the extent it is applied to bar injunctions of
ongoing state proceedings, 6 could conceivably then be viewed as an appli-
cation of the Anti-Injunction Act. Such a conclusion would logically lead
to the abolition of the narrow exceptions to Younger abstention,7 7 but as
so modified (in fact, expanded) the doctrine would be insulated from a
separation-of-powers critique. Even if the Mitchum analysis were rejected,
however, there remains at least an arguable construction of the Anti-
Injunction Act that could justify most of the injunctions that Younger
bars.7 8
73. 407 U.S. at 243.
74. Proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of § 1983, believed "that state
courts were being used to harass and injure individuals . . ." Id. at 240.
75. For example, in explicating Younger, the Court has emphasized the need to avoid the "un-
seemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally
with the federal courts 'to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States . . . .'" Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb
v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)). See also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)
(federal judicial interference with state court nuisance litigation would be "an offense to the State's
interest"). Professor Bator has urged that "we should devote serious and sustained attention to pro-
tecting and improving the conditions which determine whether constitutional claims are hospitably
adjudicated in state courts. This is a more fruitful enterprise than the channeling of more and more
cases from the state courts to the federal courts." Bator, supra note 63, at 629.
76. Several commentators have urged that Younger be extended to situations in which a state
enforcement proceeding is merely contemplated. See Bator, supra note 63, at 616-21; Whitten, supra
note 68. The Anti-Injunction Act, however, is applicable only when there is an ongoing state proceed-
ing. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
77. These exceptions include prosecutions filed in bad faith, multiple prosecutions for purposes of
harassment, and blatantly unconstitutional state statutes. For a discussion of these exceptions, see M.
REDISH, supra note 1, at 304-07.
78. In my earlier writing on the Anti-Injunction Act, I argued that the "in-aid-of-jurisdiction"
exception should receive a broader construction than the courts have given it. Properly construed, the
exception would vest in the federal district court discretion to enjoin a parallel state proceeding, the
outcome of which might significantly interfere with the federal court's meaningful exercise of its juris-
diction. Redish, supra note 46, at 743-60. Thus,
[i]f, in addition to seeking an injunction, the federal complaint [under § 1983] also seeks a
declaration of the federal rights being adjudicated in the state proceeding, the requirement that
the federal court possess jurisdiction to be aided is met so long as the declaratory judgment
request is cognizable in federal court. The free exercise of jurisdiction to render the declaratory
judgment might be impeded substantially by the operation of collateral estoppel if the state
proceeding concludes first.
Id. at 759 (footnote omitted). If courts adopt my approach, the "'in-aid-of-jurisdiction' exception
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If, on the other hand, one accepts the logic of the Mitchum holding-as
the Court presumably does when it expands the reach of Younger absten-
tion 7 -then the equity argument fails to justify Younger abstention. The
primary purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is to limit potential friction
between state and federal courts.80 If Congress intended section 1983 to be
an exception to the statute's bar, then presumably Congress decided that
the dangers of increased federal-state friction are outweighed by the need
to enforce the federal rights guaranteed by section 1983. It is inconceiv-
able that Congress would vest in the federal judiciary total discretion to
overrule the product of the congressional balancing process.
One might counter that Congress decided to grant the federal judiciary
the discretion to reach a different result in individual cases not foreseen by
Congress. But Younger represents considerably more than judicial discre-
tion to restrike the balance in individual cases. Qualified only by a narrow
set of rarely-used exceptions,"1 Younger abstention is all but total.,2 Thus,
if Mitchum is valid, Younger abstention represents an effective reversal of
the congressional decision to make section 1983 an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act. In any event, even if Younger abstention were to take the
form of an individualized, case-by-case analysis, in light of Mitchum a
separation-of-powers analysis of judicial lawmaking requires that such a
practice be justified by convincing evidence in the legislative history (of
either the Anti-Injunction Act or section 1983). No one has ever suggested
that such evidence exists.
In sum, the combined effect-if not the motivation-of the Court's deci-
sions in Younger and Mitchum is that the federal judiciary has arrogated
to itself the authority to decide when to enjoin state court proceedings. It
is difficult to imagine a starker illustration of judicial usurpation of legis-
lative authority. To the extent that Younger is viewed as a judge-made
might achieve many of the results reached by the Mitchum approach. . . while avoiding many of the
problems generated by the Mitchuin approach." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (pending civil proceeding); Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (ongoing civil enforcement action).
80. See Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (The statute "is
an historical mechanism ... for achieving harmony in one phase of our complicated federalism by
avoiding needless friction between two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction over the same
subject-matter."); Redish, supra note 46, at 718.
81. See Redish, supra note 5, at 473-74.
82. As Soifer and Macgill have observed:
The considerations of equity and comity developed through decades by the Court to accommo-
date the tensions among state power, federal power, and individual rights, have been turned
into a single, rigid commandment of federal judicial inaction that violates even such rules as
equity and comity could be said to have contained. As the Court declared recently, "where a
case is properly within [the scope of the Younger doctrine], there is no discretion to grant
injunctive relief." [quoting Colorado Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816
n.22 (1976).] This rigidity has eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity.
Soifer & Macgill, supra note 69, at 1143 (footnote omitted) (brackets in original).
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doctrine, then, it cannot be rationalized on the basis of traditional equita-
ble principles.
Equitable principles do not justify Pullman abstention any more than
they explain the Younger doctrine. In Pullman, Justice Frankfurter at-
tempted to rationalize that form of judge-made abstention as a traditional
exercise of the judiciary's equitable powers:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue
by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by
a state adjudication. . . .The resources of equity are equal to an
adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as
the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.
An appeal to the chancellor . . . is an appeal to the "exercise of
the sound discretion, which guides the determination of courts of eq-
uity." . . . The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard
for public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
the injunction. . . . Few public interests have a higher claim upon
the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless
friction with state policies . . . .This use of equitable powers is a
contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation be-
tween state and federal authority without the need of rigorous con-
gressional restriction of those powers."3
This resort to equity fails to rationalize Pullman abstention. Initially,
the doctrine has never been limited to cases in which equitable relief is
sought.84 More importantly, Justice Frankfurter's reliance on equitable
principles as a means of avoiding friction within the federal system
amounts to an historical non-sequitur. As previously noted,85 the doctrine
of equity was developed in England, which knows no federal structure.
One may reasonably wonder, then, how Justice Frankfurter could assert
that the doctrine of equity can serve as a vehicle for the judicial accommo-
dation of federalism concerns.
The most puzzling aspect of Justice Frankfurter's analysis is the asser-
tion that a federal court's equity powers allow it to take account of feder-
alism concerns "without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of
those powers." '86 He seems to imply that Congress has silently chosen to
allow the federal courts to limit themselves, so that Congress need not do
so. But, as already noted, Congress has limited federal judicial power
when it deemed such limitation necessary to protect federalism interests.
83. 312 U.S. at 500-01.
84. See, e.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per curiam).
85. See discussion supra p. 85.
86. 312 U.S. at 501.
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The Anti-Injunction Act is one example. There is thus no basis for infer-
ring such an implied delegation of congressional authority to the federal
courts. 
87
C. The Unique Impact of Pullman Abstention
The unique nature of Pullman abstention suggests an arguable means
of rationalizing it with separation-of-powers. While all other forms of
partial abstention in some sense preclude, or at least have the potential of
precluding, federal court adjudication, Pullman abstention does nothing
more in theory than delay federal adjudication. Under the terms of this
form of abstention, the federal court simply gives the state courts an op-
portunity to provide a definitive construction of an ambiguous state stat-
ute's meaning. However, if the plaintiff so indicates, he may reserve the
opportunity to return to federal court for the adjudication of the federal
issue once the state court has definitively construed the state law."8 In a
sense, then, Pullman abstention may be deemed not to undermine separa-
tion-of-powers principles, because it does not actually preclude the exer-
cise of federal court jurisdiction.
But even a delay in the exercise of federal jurisdiction may be consid-
ered a violation of separation of powers if it has not been contemplated by
Congress. 9 Conceptually, a delay of federal adjudication constitutes a
modification of the statutory structure, much as a preclusion under nar-
rowly defined circumstances may. The difference is merely one of degree.
Moreover, invocation of Pullman abstention may, as a practical matter, so
severely delay the exercise of federal jurisdiction that it acts as a signifi-
cant deterrent to the resort to federal court."
D. The "Safety Valve" Rationale
The final means of attempting to justify most forms of partial absten-
tion is the so-called "safety valve" rationale. Under this theory, partial
abstention is allowed, despite the absence of express congressional authori-
zation, because the social and political results of an abolition of abstention
would be so disastrous that Congress could not possibly have contemplated
them. In a sense, this analysis represents a form of the "clear statement"
87. Justice Frankfurter's comment is even more puzzling in light of the fact that his statement
was followed by a citation to the existing form of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id.
88. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964).
89. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in rejecting the requirement of exhaustion of state
administrative remedies for § 1983 suits in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
90. See Field, supra note 1, at 1087.
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rule of statutory construction: Unless Congress has expressly and inescap-
ably said so, the courts will not construe a statute to reach such a result."
Before discussing the merits of this theory, it is necessary to underscore
the limited nature of the inquiry authorized by such a rationalization.
Under separation-of-powers principles, the inquiry cannot amount to an
argument over whether, as a matter of social policy, federal abstention
represents the wiser course. The "safety valve" rationale for judge-made
abstention is a variation on the implied delegation argument, an argument
that should not be employed freely, lest the judgments of the electorally
accountable legislature be too easily circumvented by the judiciary. In fact,
one could persuasively argue that no matter how disastrous the social re-
sults, unless the courts can find substantial and convincing support in the
legislative history for a finding of implied delegation, none should be
found.
It is not necessary to rely on this analysis to reject the "safety valve"
rationale, however, because it is clear that the harms prevented by the
abstention doctrines are not so overwhelming as to be -disastrous, and
many could be avoided more simply by resort to such devices as legitimate
statutory construction and traditional equitable principles. The abstention
doctrines create more harm than they avoid.
1. Younger Abstention
The social policy harms thought to be avoided by Younger abstention
include the fear that state judges will be insulted by the doubts raised
about their competence to enforce federal rights,92 that state executive and
legislative policies will be undermined by federal rather than state adjudi-
cation of their constitutionality, 93 and that federal injunctions of ongoing
state judicial proceedings will unduly disrupt the conduct of the state judi-
cial process. 9 '
The most puzzling of these rationales is the concern for the judicial
treatment of state legislative and executive policies. First, the argument is
inconsistent with the initial Younger rationale, that federal injunctions
question the traditional assumption that state courts will enforce federal
rights as competently and as enthusiastically as federal courts. If it is
91. See Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973). This type of analysis is a form of what Professor Calabresi
has described as the "second look" doctrine. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 18 (1982).
92. See supra note 75.
93. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443-46 (1977).
94. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). For a detailed discussion of why, as a matter
of social policy rather than separation of powers, I reject these rationales for the sweeping deference
dictated by Younger, see Redish, supra note 5.
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thought that state judges, because of their proximity to the local scene,
will be more sympathetic to state concerns, 5 then it is difficult to see how
state judges can also be equally enthusiastic enforcers of federal rights
against state action.
More importantly, the rationale appears to be premised on a false char-
acterization of federal judges as "carpetbaggers." 96 Like their state coun-
terparts, federal judges generally reside within the state in which they sit.
Many have previously served as state judges. Most have had long and
distinguished careers practicing law in the state in which they sit. It is
therefore difficult to understand why federal, rather than state, adjudica-
tion will undermine state legislative and executive interests. The only
clear difference between the two is that federal judges are insulated from
external state and local political pressures, while state judges generally are
not. It is true that this distinction could make a considerable difference in
how the two will reconcile competing state and constitutional interests.
But it does not follow that we should consider this difference in deciding
whether to transfer the decision on constitutionality from state to federal
court. If anything, the distinction cuts in favor of transferring the constitu-
tional decision to federal court, since a forum subject to external political
pressures from the very political institutions whose conduct is challenged
arguably fails to provide the independence required by due process.9 7 At
the very least, we should not allow this difference to cause us to order
federal deference to the state processes.
The only conceivably "disastrous" result from abolishing Younger ab-
stention would be the possible disruption of the state judicial process. One
could conjure visions of defendants in state prosecutions who, after unsuc-
cessfully challenging the admissibility of evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, walk across the street to the federal courthouse to seek an injunc-
tion of the state proceeding as a violation of section 1983. In this context,
a federal injunction would indeed constitute a major disruption of the
state judicial process.
Younger abstention, however, is not necessary to avoid this disruption.
By its terms, section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief only if a federal
right has been violated. Thus, unless an individual has suffered a depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property, the state officer has not violated the due
process clause. In the above hypothetical, a federal court might not issue
an injunction, reasoning that no deprivation of the state defendant's lib-
erty resulted from the state court's admission of the challenged evidence.
At the earliest, such a deprivation would result when the defendant is
95. See Bator, supra note 63.
96. See Neuborne, supra note 14, at 1128.
97. I have explored this issue in greater detail in Redish, supra note 15.
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convicted, and perhaps not until he begins serving his sentence. In any
event, the relevant point is not the state judge's decision to admit the evi-
dence. Once it is recognized that the deprivation does not occur until some
point after the conviction, it is reasonable to construe congressional intent
to mean that the Habeas Corpus Act,9" which is specifically designed to
apply to post-conviction review and which expressly provides for exhaus-
tion of state judicial remedies,"9 supersedes the more general terms of sec-
tion 1983. Under section 1983, then, federal injunctions would rarely is-
sue against ongoing state proceedings, since the interlocutory decisions of
state judges generally do not themselves constitute deprivations of a consti-
tutionally protected interest.
The primary exception is a situation involving First Amendment rights,
as in Younger itself. There the federal plaintiff had been indicted for dis-
tributing leaflets alleged to be in violation of the California Criminal Syn-
dicalism Act. He sought a federal Court injunction of the state prosecution
on the grounds that the state law violated the First Amendment and that
the state prosecution chilled the continued exercise of his free speech
rights. If one accepts the "chilling effect" concept (and it has a venerable
heritage in the law of the First Amendment),' then under the unique
circumstances of a First Amendment violation, the very existence of the
prosecution constitutes a deprivation of liberty. As such, it constitutes a
violation of section 1983.
In his opinion for the Court in Younger, Justice Black seriously ques-
tioned the validity of the "chilling effect" analysis, and doubts about the
doctrine are far from frivolous.' 0 ' These issues are beyond the scope of
this Article. The important point for separation-of-powers purposes is
that Justice Black did not confine himself to a debate over the efficacy of
the "chilling effect" rationale. If he had, Younger could be viewed simply
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
100. The concept relates principally to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. See County
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155 (1979). It has also been relied upon to justify creation of a broad
First Amendment privilege for defamation of public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
101. Justice Black stated that:
this sort of "chilling effect," as the Court [in Dombrowski] called it, should not by itself justify
federal intervention. In the first place, the chilling effect cannot be satisfactorily eliminated by
federal injunctive relief. . . . The chilling effect can, of course, be eliminated by an injunction
that would prohibit any prosecution whatever for conduct occurring prior to a satisfactory
rewriting of the statute. But the States would then be stripped of all power to prosecute even
the socially dangerous and constitutionally unprotected conduct that had been covered by the
statute, until a new statute could be passed by the state legislature and approved by the federal
courts in potentially lengthy trial and appellate proceedings.
401 U.S. at 50-51.
Doubts about the doctrine are far from frivolous. See Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger
Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 546 (1974) ("Chilling effect decisions are often dependent on the
fiction that people are aware of the content of the statutes under which they live.").
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as a substantive constitutional decision: The mere fact of prosecution does
not abridge the freedom of speech, nor does it deprive one of liberty with-
out due process. While this conclusion would have been subject to chal-
lenge as a matter of First Amendment law and policy, it would not have
been so contrived as to be vulnerable to a separation-of-powers critique.
But that was not the analysis employed in Younger. Instead, the Court
asserted inherent authority to void the implications of a statutory directive.
It is, then, the analysis in Younger, rather than its substantive result, that
represents a striking departure from separation-of-powers principles.
Even if we were to adopt a "chilling effect" rationale, relatively few
state judicial proceedings are likely to give rise to First Amendment chal-
lenges. It is conceivable, however, that the very institution of other types
of state proceedings could give rise to deprivations of liberty or property.
For example, an individual arrested on the basis of illegally seized evi-
dence might reasonably argue that he or she had been deprived of liberty
without due process at that very point. If a federal court has been denied
authority to employ judge-made abstention, an injunction against prosecu-
tion would issue in an appropriate case. But if one believes, as the Court
reasoned in Mitchum, that Congress has decided that the increase in inter-
governmental friction caused by a federal injunction of a state judicial
proceeding is justified by the need for federal judicial protection of federal
rights, then this result would have been contemplated by Congress. In any
event, if the sole issue presented in the injunction proceeding is the legal-
ity, under the Fourth Amendment, of the search and seizure that led to
the arrest, no state legislative policies are either interpreted or challenged
by a federal court. One might even argue that the state judicial process
has been freed from a burden, since a valid federal injunction of the pros-
ecution at the very onset of the state proceeding could save the state the
time and expense of conducting a proceeding that will invalidated by a
federal court in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.
It should be emphasized that a state defendant cannot, on his own,
bring to a halt a state judicial proceeding. He must first obtain some form
of federal injunctive relief, either preliminary or permanent. In deciding
whether to issue such relief in an individual case, a federal court will
presumably inquire into the questions traditionally asked in equity analy-
sis. If the federal plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits or has unduly delayed in seeking equitable relief, the federal
court may properly deny such relief. A state defendant thus cannot em-
ploy the federal courts simply as a delaying or harassing tactic. It is true
that the state may be subjected to the requirements of the discovery pro-
cess in the federal action. But given the available methods of curbing dis-
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covery abuse, 102 it is difficult to imagine that this would so burden the
resources of the state prosecutor as to fall within the extreme category of
exceptions contemplated by the "safety valve" rationale.
2. Pullman Abstention
The social purposes thought to be served by Pullman abstention are
well known.103 Federal courts traditionally attempt to avoid the unneces-
sary decision of federal constitutional issues, and when the validity of state
law is challenged, simple principles of federalism dictate that the federal
judiciary avoid invalidating the law under the federal Constitution if at all
possible. If federal court abstains pending state judicial construction of a
challenged state law, it may not need to reach the issue of the law's
constitutionality.
Of course, these goals might be accomplished without resort to Pullman
abstention. A federal court that desires to avoid a constitutional confronta-
tion may provide its own narrowing construction of the state statute.
However, a federal judicial construction of a state statute is not binding
on the state courts. Ideally, the state courts should be given the first op-
portunity to provide a definitive construction of an ambiguous state
statute.
Federal construction of state statutes, however, is by no means uncom-
mon. Federal courts are often called upon to interpret state statutes in the
exercise of their diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has rejected the
uncertainty of state law as a basis for federal judicial refusal to exercise
diversity jurisdiction.11 Yet federal judicial constructions of state statutes
in the course of the exercise of the diversity jurisdiction are no less diffi-
cult or temporary than in the exercise of the jurisdiction over constitu-
tional challenges to state statutes.
The harms caused by resort to Pullman abstention are arguably as
great as those which it is designed to avoid. Determining whether a state
statute is sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to Pullman abstention
requires a significant amount of judicial time and effort. Pullman absten-
tion may substantially delay the enforcement of federal rights.105 More-
over, one may question whether the interests of federalism are furthered
by a procedure that effectively employs state courts as little more than
research assistants for the federal judiciary. Nevertheless, it is conceivable
that on balance an objective policy analysis would dictate the continued
use of Pullman abstention. Because the benefits of the doctrine are not so
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
103. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 234-35.
104. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
105. See Field, supra note 1, at 1085-86.
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overwhelmingly greater than its harms that reasonable people could not
differ over the issue, Pullman abstention cannot legitimately fall within a
"safety valve" analysis. The careful weighing of competing social and po-
litical policies represented in Pullman abstention is the very function that
separation-of-powers principles assign to the legislative branch. Thus, any
continued use of Pullman abstention to modify the statutorily unlimited
substantive and jurisdictional structure should come from further congres-
sional action, not from judge-made abstention.
3. Colorado River Abstention
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,106 the
Supreme Court held that while a federal court generally may not decline
to exercise its jurisdiction in the face of a concurrent or parallel state pro-
ceeding, circumstances justifying such a stay, "though exceptional, do
nevertheless exist."' 0 Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court authorized
a federal court to dismiss the proceedings pending before it because of
factors which were arguably unique to that case. However, in the subse-
quent case of Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,'08 four members of the
Court joined in an opinion authorizing a stay of federal court proceedings
because of the existence of a parallel state action under somewhat broader
circumstances.' 09 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, emphasized
the need for a federal trial court's exercise of discretion in such matters:
There are sound reasons for our reiteration of the rule that a district
court's decision to defer proceedings because of concurrent state liti-
gation is generally committed to the discretion of that court. No one
can seriously contend that a busy federal trial judge, confronted both
with competing demands on his time for matters properly within his
jurisdiction and with inevitable scheduling difficulties because of the
unavailability of lawyers, parties, and witnesses, is not entrusted
with a wide latitude in setting his own calendar. °
This analysis confuses a district court's authority to control the timing of
adjudication with its power to decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction at
all. Of course, as a technical matter, in such a case the federal court would
merely stay the exercise of its jurisdiction. However, it is disingenuous to
construct an analysis on this premise, because a stay of the federal pro-
ceeding pending the outcome of a parallel state proceeding will inevitably
106. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
107. Id. at 818.
108. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
109. Id. at 665.
110. Id.
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lead to the use of collateral estoppel or res judicata to preclude the mean-
ingful exercise of federal court jurisdiction.
The policy justifications for this aspect of the partial abstention model
are the interest of the federal courts in docket control and the interest of
the litigants in avoiding harassment through the filing of multiple law-
suits. Neither of these concerns, however, rises to a level of social harm so
disastrous as to fall within a "safety valve" rationale. The interest in
docket control is of limited concern, because the few cases in which (1) a
parallel state proceeding exists, and (2) the federal court would for that
reason decline to exercise its jurisdiction, are unlikely to have anything
more than a marginal impact on the federal courts' dockets. Nor is the
risk of multiple litigation substantial enough to authorize judge-made ab-
stention. The danger of such harassment exists only because of the unduly
narrow construction of the so-called "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act,111 which prevents federal courts from enjoining
parallel state proceedings when there exists a serious danger of harass-
ment.1 2 The reality of litigation is that parties often attempt to employ
various strategic devices in order to impose burdens on each other. While
these may give rise to some level of unfairness, it does not follow, absent
clear congressional expression to the contrary, that the exercise of federal
jurisdiction should be sacrificed to avoid them.
Justice Rehnquist's expansion of the scope of abstention has been sig-
nificantly reduced by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp. 13 There, the Court refused to allow the lower federal
court to defer to a parallel state proceeding in a contract dispute, distin-
guishing Calvert on the ground that the review sought there was by
means of mandamus,114 while in Moses H. Cone it was by direct ap-
peal.11 5 Moreover, the Court added, "to say that the district court has
discretion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion
must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed by this
Court."1 6 Under the "exceptional circumstances" standard of Colorado
River, the abstention was not justified.
Moses H. Cone seems to indicate that abstention for parallel state pro-
ceedings will be substantially curbed. The possibility of such abstention
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) provides in relevant part: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except . . . where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction. .. ."
112. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). The Court distinguishes an action in
personain, where subsequent state action could not be prohibited, from actions in ren, where they
could. Id. at 229.
113. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
114. Id. at 938.
115. Id. at 933.
116. Id. at 938.
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still remains, however, and under the separation-of-powers analysis, even
this limited form of abstention cannot be justified.
4. Burford and Thibodaux Abstention
By far the least justifiable forms of abstention are the Burford branch
for complex state administrative schemes and Thibodaux abstention for
important but undefined state interests such as eminent domain.11 While
there may well be reasons to prefer state adjudication of controversies in-
volving complex state administrative programs, it does not follow that fed-
eral adjudication would so substantially interfere with the function of
those programs as to justify invocation of a "safety valve" exception to
congressionally dictated jurisdiction. It is quite conceivable that an objec-
tive policy analysis, wholly apart from separation-of-powers considera-
tions, would justify abandonment of these forms of abstention, because of
the difficulties in applying their broad and nebulous criteria to the facts of
individual cases. Thus, if competing policy interests are to be balanced in
favor of abstention, the concept of separation-of-powers dictates that such
a decision should be made by Congress.
E. The Confusion of Jurisdictional and Substantive Constitutional
Analysis: Parratt v. Taylor
In Parratt v. Taylor 18 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, held that a prisoner's complaint alleging the negligent loss by
prison officials of a hobby kit constituted an actionable "deprivation" of
property under section 1983. The Court, however, reasoned that the claim
would be valid only if the prisoner had been deprived of the property
without due process of law. The availability of a state tort remedy to com-
pensate a plaintiff for a negligent loss constituted due process, and the
plaintiff thus had failed to state a cause of action under section 1983.9
It may not, at first glance, be apparent how the decision in Parratt
represents a form of judge-made abstention. One might argue that the
decision is simply an interpretation of the reach of the constitutional right,
and has nothing to do with the allocation of jurisdictional authority be-
tween state and federal courts. But an analysis of the Court's reasoning
reveals that the decision has the impact of a jurisdictional doctrine in
many ways functionally indistinguishable from a judicial exhaustion re-
quirement,1 20 at least in the not uncommon case in which the deprivation
117. M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 240-55.
118. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
119. Id. at 544.
120. Judge Joiner effectively acknowledged as much in Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869
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of life, liberty, or property represents an abuse of the state officer's au-
thority.121 The Court accomplishes this significant jurisdictional realloca-
tion through its interpretation of the constitutional right sought to be en-
forced. In this manner, the Court appears to have insulated the doctrine
from a separation-of-powers critique: No one would question that it is
appropriate for the courts to interpret the meaning of a constitutional pro-
vision, and surely there is no undermining of a congressional program of
federal judicial enforcement of constitutional rights when the Court de-
cides that no right exists.
Despite the ingenious nature of this jurisdictional sleight of hand, the
substantive constitutional analysis required to reach the Court's conclusion
is devoid of logic and inconsistent with accepted constitutional precedent.
Ultimately, the doctrine amounts to a jurisdictional reallocation, a point
on occasion candidly acknowledged by supporters of such a reallocation. 122
The initial question about Parratt concerns the Court's conclusion that
the state officer's negligent loss of a $24 hobby kit amounts to a prima
facie deprivation of "property" for purposes of the due process clause.123
The conclusion is especially puzzling in light of Justice Rehnquist's ear-
lier statement for the Court that libel by a state officer does not constitute
a violation of section 1983, in part because to hold that it did would feder-
alize a substantial portion of state tort law. 2' Certainly, the same could
be said of a holding that a state officer's negligence amounts to a constitu-
tional violation. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist had previously held that a
three-day false imprisonment did not constitute a deprivation of "lib-
erty";125 it is difficult to understand how he could then conclude that the
type of deprivation involved in Parratt could rise to a constitutional level.
On the basis of either a common sense de minimis exception or the rea-
(E.D. Mich. 1983), when he stated that "[s]ince state law already provides remedies for injuries such
as those suffered by the Barniers, it is wasteful to provide additional remedies. To do otherwise en-
courages multiple litigation and undesirable forum shopping." Id. at 881. These considerations are
not relevant to the constitutional question of what constitutes due process, but rather to the broad
policy issues of jurisdictional allocation.
Parratt exhaustion actually goes further than a direct exhaustion requirement in excluding the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, because Parratt effectively excludes Supreme Court review, as well as
lower federal court jurisdiction. Whereas under Parratt the Supreme Court could presumably review
state procedures for adequacy under the due process clause, the actual application of state tort law to
the specific facts would present no federal issues, and would thus fall outside the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction.
Justice Rehnquist has, in another context, suggested that the judicial exhaustion requirement
should be reconsidered. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari), discussed infra p. 105.
121. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), the Court limited Parratt to such
situations.
122. See Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. at 881.
123. 451 U.S. at 536-37.
124. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699 (1976).
125. Baker v. MeCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
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soning that negligent conduct does not amount to the type of state conduct
at which the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed, the Court could legiti-
mately have excluded the conduct involved in Parratt from the scope of
the Constitution.
After reaching that initial and uncharacteristically expansionist conclu-
sion, though, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that this deprivation of property
violates the due process clause only if the deprivation is undertaken with-
out due process. 126 While he acknowledged that the negligent loss took
place prior to any hearing, he noted that a post-deprivation hearing some-
times satisfies procedural due process requirements. 127 Justice Rehnquist
concluded in Parratt that there was no violation of due process as long as
the state provided a "post-deprivation hearing"-i.e., an adequate tort
remedy for damages.' 2
8
The Court's procedural due process analysis is defective because it at-
tempts to squeeze a square peg into a round hole. The basic assumption
of a procedural due process analysis is that the ultimate result-i.e., the
loss of property or liberty-is not inherently unconstitutional; it is uncon-
stitutional only if adequate procedures are not followed. For example,
welfare benefits may be deemed a property interest sufficient to trigger
the requirements of due process, 29 but as long as the state takes away
these benefits only after affording sufficient procedures to determine that
the deprivation is justified, there has been no constitutional violation. On
the other hand, if the state enacts a law saying all Jews are to be denied
governmental benefits, the law's unconstitutionality is not cured by the
provision of a full dress pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether the
individual in question actually is Jewish; the end result is unconstitu-
tional, regardless of the procedures that are followed. The constitutional
defect does not turn on the availability of procedures, and the constitu-
tional issue is therefore not one of procedural due process.
The Court's characterization of Parratt as a procedural due process
case is erroneous. The essence of the constitutional deprivation in the con-
text of procedural due process is the loss of a protected interest absent
adequate procedure. It-is incorrect to suggest that the end result of a neg-
ligent loss of a prisoner's property is rendered legitimate and appropri-
ate-like the revocation of welfare benefits-by the provision of proper
procedures. One could not, ex ante, validly assert that a state officer's
126. Id. at 537.
127. A post-deprivation hearing is sufficient, for example, when the need for state action is so
immediate and compelling that it is not feasible to provide a predeprivation hearing. Id. at 538. See
North American Cold Storage v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (under police power, state may
seize and destroy unwholesome food without notice or hearing; owner has right of action afterward).
128. 451 U.S. at 543.
129. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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negligent loss of property is acceptable behavior as long as proper proce-
dures are followed. Though of course such negligent loss may be subse-
quently compensated, the same is true of any illegal behavior. This fact in
no way renders the behavior legitimate.
The analysis may be clouded somewhat by the specific facts of Parratt
because it is not obvious that a negligent loss of property is any kind of
constitutional violation, whether or not accompanied by adequate proce-
dures. The point may be better understood when applied in a wholly dif-
ferent context (one in which a number of lower courts have in fact em-
ployed the Parratt analysis13 0): the physical beating of an individual by
state or local officials. It is difficult to imagine that the end result of a
beating could ever be justified by the provision of adequate procedures;
the case is more analogous to the discrimination against Jews, than to the
removal of welfare benefits, because in neither the beating nor discrimina-
tion examples can the end result be "purified" by the use of proper
procedures.
If one were to accept Justice Rehnquist's assumption that a constitu-
tional defect in the conduct of state officers may be cured by the provision
of a state compensatory tort remedy, even the most egregious and inten-
tional violation of constitutional rights by state officers could be trans-
formed into a "procedural" due process case. Take for example the unjus-
tified police disruption of a political rally and the beating of demonstrators
solely because of distaste for the political views expressed. While the of-
ficers' conduct may be thought to violate the First Amendment, it is only
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause that such state
action gives rise to a constitutional violation. However, if the violation of
First Amendment rights could be compensated subsequently by state tort
remedies, no constitutional violation would have taken place. Once the
Court extends the concept of "procedural" due process to include the pro-
vision of state compensatory "procedures" for conduct that reaches uncon-
stitutional results, no state action can logically be deemed to violate the
due process clause unless and until available state tort remedies have been
pursued. 31 This conclusion distorts the concept of procedural due process
into a thinly-veiled creation of a state judicial exhaustion requirement.
130. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), afJ'd on
other grounds sub non. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F.
Supp. at 876-79.
131. It is true that Justice Rehnquist implied that the due process analysis of Parratt was inap-
plicable to cases involving violations of the first eight amendments. 451 U.S. at 536. But it is difficult
to understand how he can draw this distinction. All of those amendments are made applicable to the
states through the due process clause; thus, they involve liberty interests. The inherent assumption of
Rehnquist's analysis is that there is no denial of liberty or property until the state refuses to
compensate.
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One must recall that "exhaustion" in this context means considerably
more than it does in other contexts. Under the concepts of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, state court factual findings would be binding in any
subsequent federal action, and because state courts possess concurrent ju-
risdiction with federal courts over section 1983 actions, a plaintiff's failure
to join his federal cause of action in his state suit would likely bar a sub-
sequent federal action on grounds of res judicata.
More importantly, under the Parratt analysis, the constitutional viola-
tion is not the state officer's initial conduct, but the failure of the state to
provide a procedure for a compensatory remedy. Yet by its terms, section
1983 is directed toward the conduct of persons acting under color of state
law, not conduct of the state itself. Hence, the logical implication of Par-
ratt is that there can never be a violation of section 1983, at least when
the state officer has departed from accepted state practice. Moreover, the
Court in no way required that the state actually compensate the plaintiff
but merely that the opportunity for compensatory procedures be made
available. Thus, the state could deny compensation because of its own fac-
tual findings, and under Parratt no constitutional violation would exist.
Indeed, such state findings would be insulated from any federal review,
even in the Supreme Court. The Court has thus devised a "super" ex-
haustion requirement that not only effectively precludes lower federal
court review of state judicial findings, but precludes Supreme Court re-
view as well.
Parratt appears superficially consistent with the legal process and
separation-of-powers concerns that are the focus of this Article. The
Court no doubt possesses legitimate authority to interpret the meaning of
the Constitution, and theoretically Congress' legislative and jurisdictional
schemes for federal judicial enforcement of federal constitutional rights are
not undermined when no constitutional right has been violated. But when
the Court so clearly distorts the meaning of constitutional provisions in
order to achieve a major reallocation of jurisdictional authority not con-
templated by the congressional structure, as it has done in Parratt, resort
to substantive constitutional analysis cannot insulate the Court from a
separation-of-powers critique.
F. Partial Abstention in the Diversity Context
The federal courts have long refused to exercise diversity jurisdiction
over certain types of cases-primarily matters of probate 2 and domestic
132. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: Probate Matters, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 462
(1962).
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relations 1 3-that seemingly fall within the terms of their jurisdiction.
Originally, the rationale for these two exceptions was framed in terms of
statutory construction. Since historically neither of these types of cases
would have been heard in the ecclesiastical courts,13 both types of cases
were thought to fall outside of the diversity jurisdiction statute, which
originally applied to "suits of a civil nature in law or in equity." It was
additionally suggested that diversity jurisdiction could not extend to suits
between husband and wife, because a wife could not have a different resi-
dence from her husband.13 5 Today, all of these arguments premised on
statutory construction have been abandoned, and it now appears that the
exceptions are simply manifestations of judge-made abstention, founded
on grounds of social policy.1 38
These forms of partial abstention can be tested under the same stan-
dards applied to the other forms. There is no clear indication in the legis-
lative history that the courts should be permitted to impose their own lim-
itations on the exercise of this jurisdiction, and no basis exists in
traditional equity doctrine to authorize the limitations. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult to believe that the consequences of federal, rather than state, adjudi-
cation of these matters would be any more disastrous than the exercise of
the federal diversity jurisdiction in many other areas of state concern.13 7
Judge Posner has suggested several plausible practical justifications for
the probate exception, including promotion of legal certainty and judicial
economy.1 8 While these arguments could arguably justify a legislatively
imposed exception to the diversity jurisdiction, these practical considera-
tions are certainly not so overwhelming as to fall within the concept of a
"safety valve" rationale. Finally, Congress itself has imposed limitations
on diversity jurisdiction, in the terms of the jurisdictional grant itself13 ' as
133. See Note, Application of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic Relations Excep-
tion to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095.
134. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 143-44. In Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1983), Judge Posner noted that the probate exception had only "shoddy"
historical underpinnings; "there was no ecclesiastical court in America, and it is not obvious why the
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 should be taken to refer exclusively to English rather than
American courts." 679 F.2d at 713. He also cited the uncertain scope of the ecclesiastical court's
exclusive jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, Judge Posner concluded that the probate exception
is too well established a feature of our federal system to be lightly discarded, and by an inferior
court at that, even if we were to reject as artificial the proposition that Congress's failure to
repeal the exception when reenacting from time to time the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts indicates congressional acquiescence.
Id.
135. Note, supra note 133, at 1097.
136. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 144; Note, supra note 133, at 1099.
137. For example, Professor Meador has argued that all personal injury cases arising under state
law should be statutorily excluded from diversity jurisdiction. Meador, A New Approach to Limiting
Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A. J. 383 (1960).
138. Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1983).
139. For example, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982), extends diversity jurisdiction
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well as in separate statutes.14 Congress has thus not generally ceded to
the courts the province of developing limitations on the exercise of the
diversity jurisdiction.
The only conceivable distinction between these forms of partial absten-
tion and the others is that these are inherently limited to the exercise of
the diversity jurisdiction,"" which has for many years been the subject of
considerable debate and criticism,"" as well as of numerous moves in
Congress for repeal or severe limitation.1 43 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has, in construing the terms of the diversity grant, developed principles of
questionable logic that function only to serve the thinly-veiled goal of
curbing the scope of the diversity grant.1 44 One might therefore argue that
the basis for an implied delegation to the judiciary is somewhat stronger
in the diversity area than in other exercises of federal jurisdiction. Ulti-
mately, however, there exists no real basis upon which to distinguish ab-
stention in the diversity context. Although diversity jurisdiction is fre-
quently disparaged, Congress has consistently refused to abolish or even
limit the scope of the diversity grant. Moreover, there is no rational basis
upon which to distinguish the probate and domestic relations areas from
numerous other areas of state concern; general dislike of diversity jurisdic-
tion cannot serve to justify select treatment of these two subjects. If one
were to succeed in building an implied delegation rationale to justify di-
versity abstention, then separation-of-powers principles would require
concrete and direct evidence that Congress actually intended such a dele-
gation. Those who have argued in support of diversity abstention to date
have not attempted to provide such evidence.
only to "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of S10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs. .. "
140. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) provides that "[a] district court shall not have juris-
diction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills,
Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969) (applying § 1359).
141. Other forms of partial abstention either apply only to constitutional challenges to state action
or else apply to multiple bases of federal jurisdiction.
142. E.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDITION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (1973).
143. See, e.g., H.R. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 361 (1977); H.R. 9622, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Ec. 34124 (1977); H.R. 10050, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
37089 (1977); H.R. 5546, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 8744 (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 29523 (1977); H.R. 7243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
15153 (1977); H.R. 9308, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. RE. 30989 (1977).
144. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (narrow construction of the
words "matter in controversy" in the diversity statute, for purposes of measuring jurisdictional
amount); United Steel Workers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965) (determina-
tion that, for purposes of diversity, a private association's citizenship is citizenship of each of its
members, increasing likelihood of absence of complete diversity).
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III. THE TOTAL ABSTENTION MODEL:
JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUE
To my knowledge, no scholar or judge has ever expressly called upon
the federal courts to ignore the congressional grant of jurisdiction to adju-
dicate suits against persons acting under color of state law for violations of \
federal rights.14 However, several legal doctrines developed by the Jus-
tices, if accepted by a majority of the Court, could effectively exclude the
lower federal courts from the exercise of their jurisdictional authority to
enforce section 1983. In the discussion that follows, I describe the several
theories and legal devices which make up the total abstention model.
A. The State Judicial "Exhaustion" Theory
Ironically, one finds the seeds of the most sweeping aspect of the total
abstention model in the opinion that revitalized the section 1983 action
after many years of dormancy. In Monroe v. Pape,'" the Court recog-
nized a cause of action under section 1983 in a suit seeking damages from
local police officers who allegedly violated plaintiffs' Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 47 The
decision created an enormous stir, and was widely perceived as marking a
new age in federal judicial activism against unconstitutional state con-
duct.148 The Court, per Justice Douglas, emphasized that a plaintiff need
not exhaust his or her state judicial remedies,1 49 a conclusion which sug-
gested expansive federal judicial authority to enforce section 1983. Dis-
cussing the history and purpose of the 1871 Civil Rights legislation, how-
ever, Justice Douglas noted that "it provided a remedy where state law
was inadequate,"150 and that its aim "was to provide a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."151 Justice Rehnquist-the leading architect of the total absten-
tion model-has pointed to these statements in Monroe in urging a "re-
consideration" of Monroe's no-judicial-exhaustion rule. The statutory
purposes cited in Monroe, Justice Rehnquist argues, "need not bar ex-
haustion where the State can demonstrate that there is an available and
adequate state remedy.) 1 52
145. The congressional grant is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982).
146, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
147. Id. at 170.
148. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort. Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 277 (1965).
149. 365 U.S. at 183.
150. Id. at 173.
151. Id. at 174.
152. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 911 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
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An obvious difficulty with Justice Douglas' conclusion is that neither
the substantive nor the jurisdictional statutes provide a federal remedy
only "when state law was inadequate." The absence of such language
probably reflects a congressional decision to allow the plaintiff to make
that determination for him or herself. Indeed, at another point in Monroe,
Justice Douglas seems to contradict his earlier purpose analysis by noting
that "[a]lthough the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that
existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as
applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned
over and again in the debates."15
It may, at first, appear inaccurate to characterize Justice Rehnquist's
statement as urging a form of "total" abstention. First, he suggests merely
exhaustion of state judicial remedies, which one might reasonably believe
would only delay federal adjudication, not preclude it. Second, he purports
to leave open the possibility of federal court adjudication where the state is
unable to demonstrate the existence of an adequate remedy. As a practical
matter, however, acceptance of Justice Rehnquist's suggestion would
amount to total federal abstention.
The term "exhaustion" in this context is a euphemism. In situations
not involving section 1983, a requirement of exhaustion of state remedies,
whether administrative"" or judicial," would result simply in a delay of
federal court adjudication. When, and only when, the required state reme-
dies had been sought, the plaintiff could return to federal court for adjudi-
cation of a federal claim. Such a practice has its disadvantages, but at least
at some point a federal court may exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate the
federal claim. A requirement of state judicial exhaustion, on the other
hand, would have no such result. We could, I suppose, structure our sys-
tem so that a plaintiff who completed the state judicial adjudication of
state remedies could return to federal court. This is, in fact, exactly what
happens under habeas corpus' 5 6-a device which Professor Cover has de-
scribed as "diachronic or sequential redundancy.11 57 But outside the ex-
pressly contemplated exception in the habeas corpus model, this jurisdic-
tional route is unavailable to plaintiffs, as Justice Rehnquist was no doubt
aware when he urged reconsideration of the use of "exhaustion" of state
judicial remedies in section 1983 actions.
denial of certiorari).
153. 365 U.S. at 183.
154. The administrative exhaustion requirement for § 1983 suits was firmly rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
157. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 639, 646 (1981).
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The Supreme Court held in Allen v. McCurry58 that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel-the binding effect of a finding of fact or of a mixed
question of law and fact in a previous state judicial action on a subsequent
federal action-barred section 1983 plaintiffs. Under the Full Faith and
Credit Act, 59 a federal court must employ the broader doctrine of res
judicata, which bars litigation of any aspect of the same cause of action or
any claim arising out of the same operative facts which might have been
brought.160 Since it is well established that state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 suits,161 a failure to raise a sec-
tion 1983 claim in the course of the state judicial action would bar a sub-
sequent federal suit.
Perhaps Justice Rehnquist intended to imply that if the Court were to
impose a state judicial exhaustion requirement, the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata would be abandoned. However, he gave no such
indication, and it is highly unlikely that he would intend this result. Not
surprisingly, those who call for one or another form of state judicial ex-
haustion generally endorse the Allen decision.162 Much the same philoso-
phy lies behind both: a belief in the extensive use of state courts as the
forum for the adjudication of federal constitutional challenges to state ac-
tion.163 Hence, one must assume that Justice Rehnquist did not intend to
abandon the dictates either of Allen or of the Full Faith and Credit Act
when he called for reconsideration of the exhaustion of state judicial reme-
dies in section 1983 actions. Thus structured, the so-called exhaustion re-
quirement does considerably more than delay lower federal court adjudi-
cation; it effectively precludes it, leaving section 1343-the jurisdictional
component of section 1983-a null set.
It is probably safe to assume that Justice Rehnquist did not intend a
probing case-by-case inquiry.1 64 In theory, it is true that his analysis still
158. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
160. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 at 531 (2d ed. 1977); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982).
161. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
162. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 63, at 616.
163. Professor Bator has written:
The participation of the state courts in the formulation and application of federal constitu-
tional principles is, after all, the explicit premise of the supremacy clause, and has been deeply
engrained in our institutional structures since the beginning. Its legitimacy and desirability are
buttressed by an enormous tradition of federalistic rhetoric, running in an unbroken line from
the Federalist Papers down to today's Supreme Court opinions.
Bator, supra note 63, at 606 (footnotes omitted).
164. One clear indication that Justice Rehnquist's "adequacy" analysis of available state remedies
would be something less than fully rigorous appeared in his opinion for the Court in Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). There, by means of substantive constitutional analysis, Justice Rehn-
quist effectively adopted his state exhaustion requirement, at least in certain cases. See discussion
supra pp. 98-101. He found the state tort remedy adequate in that case, even though it failed to
afford all of the substantive advantages of a section 1983 suit. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
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leaves room for federal judicial action where state remedies are found in-
adequate. But a detailed, probing, case-by-case federal judicial inquiry
into the adequacy of substantive and procedural state remedies necessarily
entails a significant increase in the federal courts' workload and in the
frictions of judicial federalism. Indeed, it is the fear of these very dangers
that has caused the Supreme Court to render all but useless the Civil
Rights Removal Statute,"6 5 even though the statutory language expressly
calls for such a case-by-case inquiry. 66
How an "adequacy" analysis would work in practice is candidly illus-
trated by Professor Bator, who has endorsed a similar approach (albeit in
a somewhat more limited context):
[T]he "full and fair opportunity" formula leaves untouched the more
subtle and invisible aspects of comparative competence. Indeed, it
does not purport to be a technique for measuring the state judge's
competence and sensitivity at all. If we are fundamentally suspicious
of the state court system-if the central problem continues to be the
problem of mistrust-then the "full and fair opportunity" formula
will not do. I realize, too, that much will turn on the spirit in which
the "full and fair opportunity" formula is interpreted in the various
specific contexts to which it is relevant. Nevertheless, it is a virtue of
this formula that it asks a question about the hospitable nature of
the state courts rather than starting with an adverse presumption
about it.16 7
Most states will provide theoretically adequate tort remedies for any con-
duct that amounts to a substantive violation of section 1983.168 Since
neither Justice Rehnquist nor Professor Bator accepts the traditional in-
stitutional arguments for state court inadequacy, 69 only in those rare
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be
removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a
right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States,
or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof ....
The statute finds its origins in § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
166. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879); see also Redish, Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 523,
524-26 (1980) (courts should permit removal where a state defendant is unable to enforce his federal
right to equality in state court).
167. Bator, supra note 63, at 626-27 (footnotes omitted). Professor Bator purported to consider,
"at least directly," only those cases "where state enforcement courts must and will adjudicate federal
constitutional defenses unless some affirmative intervention occurs to 'reroute' the federal question into
a federal district court." Id. at 611 n.16.
168. Id. at 626-27.
169. For Justice Rehnquist's views, see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1979) (state pro-
ceedings offer adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims). For Professor Bator's views, see
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cases in which the entire state judicial process is glaringly inadequate,
would either of them be willing to find that state procedural remedies did
not provide a plaintiff with a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate. Thus,
while purists might quibble with my characterization of Justice Rehn-
quist's call for a state judicial exhaustion requirement as a form of total
abstention in section 1983 suits, in reality that is exactly what Justice
Rehnquist seeks.
B. Expansion of Pullman Abstention into Total Abstention
Pullman abstention itself cannot be deemed an element in the total ab-
stention model, since it will be used only in the relatively rare situations
in which the challenged state law is ambiguous. A minor modification of
the doctrine, however, could shift it toward the total abstention model.
There are two ways to transform Pullman abstention into total absten-
tion. One alternative, suggested by Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Wis-
consin v. Constantineau,17 0 is to expand the doctrine into a state judicial
exhaustion requirement. Traditionally, Pullman abstention applies only
when the challenged state law presents the ambiguity. On rare occasions,
however, the Court has employed the doctrine when the state constitution
contains a provision that might invalidate the state law without a federal
constitutional challenge.1 ' In Constantineau, the Court appeared to have
limited this branch of the doctrine to situations in which the state constitu-
tion provides a unique and specialized form of protection. 172 The Chief
Justice, however, was unwilling to limit resort to state constitutional rem-
edies to such special cases.173 Since virtually every state constitution con-
tains a protection similar or identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protection clauses, it would be a rare case indeed in
which the Chief Justice would not order federal abstention17 4 in a case
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
The second alternative, articulated by Justice Rehnquist, represents an
equally clear modification of the doctrine into a type of total abstention.
In a decision in which Pullman abstention was not at issue, 17 5 Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court suggested that "[a]lmost every constitu-
generally Bator, supra note 63.
170. 400 U.S. at 433, 439-43 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
171. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
172. 400 U.S. 433.
173. Though the Chief Justice acknowledged that the state law was probably unconstitutional, he
contended that it was "a very odd business to strike down a state statute, on the books for almost 40
years, without any opportunity for the state courts to dispose of the problem either under the Wiscon-
sin Constitution or the U.S. Constitution." 400 U.S. at 440.
174. In the context of this discussion, one must recall the applicability of the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. See discussion supra p. 107.
175. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
The Yale Law Journal
tional challenge . . . offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions
that might obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate
federal constitutional concerns and state interests."' 7 Justice Rehnquist
did not take this totally unsupported assertion to its logical conclu-
sion 17 -that a federal court should abstain in every federal constitutional
challenge to a state statute. However, when combined with a logical inter-
pretation of Justice Rehnquist's suggested "reconsideration" of a state ju-
dicial exhaustion requirement, this analysis provides the final piece to the
total abstention model, creating a structure that effectively precludes the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction under section 1343 to adjudicate fed-
eral constitutional challenges to any form of state action, and that instead
places primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for the protection of federal
rights in the state judiciaries.
C. The Separation-of-Powers Critique of the Total Abstention Model
The separation-of-powers attack on the total abstention model is, at
least prima facie, a relatively simple and seemingly irrebuttable one. In a
constitutional democracy, the unrepresentative judiciary may overrule the
policy judgments of an electorally accountable legislative body only when
those judgments violate the Constitution. The courts may not ignore or
overrule congressional policy decisions because of simple disagreement
with their wisdom.
While the concept of partial abstention might conceivably be justified
through some notion of implied congressional delegation,"1 8 total absten-
tion has no such defense available. For it is all but inconceivable that
Congress would impliedly delegate to the courts the authority in effect to
repeal an entire substantive or jurisdictional legislative scheme. Neverthe-
less, three arguments could conceivably be advanced in support of the total
abstention model. None of these, however, can adequately support the ex-
istence of the sweeping incursion on the legislative prerogative contem-
plated by the total abstention model.
1. The Social Policy Argument in Favor of State Adjudication
A proponent of total abstention might defend the model by contending
that adoption of the principle in no way represents a repeal of section
1983, since the concept simply makes the state judiciaries the primary
176. Id. at 429-30.
177. Moore ultimately relied on Younger, because the federal court action sought to interfere with
an ongoing state proceeding. Therefore, the Court did not have to consider the broader abstention
issue.
178. See supra pp. 78-81.
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enforcers of the substantive federal rights-a power which they are consti-
tutionally competent to exercise. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, it disregards the primary motivating force behind the legislation.
The legislative intent-which has been well documented by commenta-
tors 17  and the Court itself 1°0-was to interpose the federal judiciary be-
tween the individual and the state, largely because of the failure of the
state courts adequately to protect the individual. Second, the total absten-
tion model conflicts not so much with the substantive directive of section
1983 as with the jurisdictional directive of section 1343. While section
1983 could conceivably coexist with a scheme supplementing federal judi-
cial enforcement by state adjudication, it is logically inconceivable that
section 1343 could survive such a move. If, as a practical matter, the fed-
eral courts completely forego their jurisdiction to enforce section 1983, the
jurisdictional statute is inescapably rendered a nullity.
The response that the status of the state courts in the 1870's is irrele-
vant to their status in the 1980's must be directed to the legislative body
rather than the judiciary. As Justice Douglas noted in Monroe,""x the leg-
islation as it currently stands is absolute in its terms: It does not limit the
federal cause of action only to the southern states, or only to situations
where the state remedy is found to be inadequate. Indeed, when the post-
Civil War Congress intended federal jurisdiction to turn upon the ade-
quacy of the state court remedy, it explicitly stated its intention, as it did
in the Civil Rights Removal Statute.18 2 The contrast between such contin-
gent, case-by-case application of federal jurisdiction to protect federal
rights and the unqualified, all-encompassing directive for enforcement of
section 1983 underscores the clear congressional intent to avoid having the
exercise of federal jurisdiction turn on the viability of the state remedy in
179. See Zeigler, supra note 5. Cf H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECr UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCrION ON THE CONSTITUTION 528-42 (1973) (comprehensive discus-
sion of Reconstruction legislation); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS
143-59 (1968) (discussion of removal statutes and congressional expansion of federal court jurisdic-
tion); Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HST.
333 (1969) (discussing expansion of federal jurisdiction during Reconstruction).
180. According to the Court's decision in Mitchum v. Foster.
The predecessor of § 1983 was ... an important part of the basic alteration in our federal
system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional
amendment. As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War
era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its centerpiece-the role of the
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly
established.
407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) (footnote omitted). The Court observed that "[piroponents of the legisla-
tion noted that state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state
courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abroga-
tion of federally protected rights." Id. at 240. See also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503
(1982) (citing Mitchum).
181. 365 U.S. at 183 (discussing § 1979). See discussion supra pp. 105-06.
182. See discussion supra p. 108.
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the individual case. In the Civil Rights Removal Statute, Congress made
access to federal courts contingent upon an objective judicial finding of the
state judiciary's inadequacy in the particular case. In the precursor to sec-
tion 1343, Congress made access contingent on a purely subjective choice,
to be made by the individual seeking to vindicate his federal right against
state intrusion. Therefore, the commonly employed argument that absten-
tion is justified because of the fungibility of state and federal courts is
unacceptable.
2. The Jurisdictional Discretion Rationale
Even accepting the questionable supposition that the substantive direc-
tive of section 1983 is not undermined by exclusive state judicial enforce-
ment, the total abstention model cannot be defended from the separation-
of-powers attack on the ground that the judiciary would be departing only
from a jurisdictional directive, rather than a substantive congressional pro-
gram. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist himself-the primary architect of the in-
cremental total abstention model-has often expressed an overriding con-
cern with congressional intent in the fashioning of jurisdictional
allocations, at least when the result has been to decrease the reach of fed-
eral court power.'8 3
The Supreme Court has recognized the important interrelations be-
tween congressional jurisdictional allocations and substantive congres-
sional programs when the state courts have refused to obey a jurisdictional
directive, even when such refusals theoretically would not have rendered
the substantive legislation a nullity.""' While the normative institutional
principle may be different (separation of powers, rather than federalism),
one could apply the same logic to a federal court's refusal to adhere to the
congressional allocation of jurisdiction. Thus, an argument that construes
a jurisdictional statute as somehow vesting a power in the federal courts to
adjudicate the relevant claims without a corresponding duty to do so is
unacceptable. Though federal jurisdictional statutes have traditionally
been framed in terms that might conceivably lead to such a construc-
tion,'8 5 the absurd results that would flow from that construction make it
183. For example, in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the
Court, held that a federal court could not assert pendent party jurisdiction over a state claim against a
municipality in a § 1983 suit, in part because Congress had not intended that municipalities be sub-
ject to liability under § 1983. Id. at 16-17.
184. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state cannot refuse to enforce federal policies); M.
REDISH, supra note 1, at 129-38 (state court refusal to adjudicate federal causes of action frustrates
federal policy that case load created by a federal statute be shared by the two judicial systems).
185. Jurisdictional statutes generally provide that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of. . . ." Though one might suggest that this language is not inherently mandatory, the use of
the term "shall" tends to undermine such an argument.
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clear that Congress could not have intended such an interpretation. Under
such a structure, every substantive right created by Congress would effec-
tively be subject to a practical veto by the federal judiciary: If a jurisdic-
tional grant is merely an invitation to exercise jurisdiction, there is no
logical reason why a federal court could not choose to disregard a particu-
lar federal statute-or a particular suit arising under a federal stat-
ute-which the Court deemed inadvisable. Surely, then, a congressional
provision of jurisdiction must mean more than simply the option for the
federal court to act. While perhaps Congress could constitutionally dele-
gate such discretionary authority to the federal judiciary, absent a much
clearer legislative directive we must assume that Congress did not intend
such a dubious result.
3. The Analogy to the Political Question Doctrine
If one were to seek a precedent for the total abstention model, the logi-
cal starting point would be the political question doctrine. This doctrine
"holds that certain matters are really political in nature and best resolved
by the body politic rather than suitable for judicial review ... ."" The
political question doctrine cannot, however, directly authorize total ab-
stention since the doctrine has been limited to situations in which another
branch of the federal government is involved. 187 Nevertheless, one could
argue that the political question doctrine establishes a category of cases
which the federal courts have declined to adjudicate, even though those
cases clearly fall within a congressional grant of jurisdiction.
Not all agree, however, that the political question doctrine authorizes
such discretionary judicial power to abstain from the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Professor Wechsler, for example, has argued that "the only proper
judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Consti-
tution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of
government than the courts." ' In other words, to be legitimate, a federal
court's refusal to adjudicate a dispute between the political branches must
be based on a substantive constitutional analysis of the Constitution's allo-
cation of authority between the political branches, not on a discretionary
refusal to adjudicate. Professor Henkin has gone so far as to question
whether any special "political question" doctrine exists at all: "One needs
no special doctrine to describe the ordinary respect of the courts for the
political domain. If a political question is one which the Constitution com-
186. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (1983).
187. See Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
188. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9
(1959).
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mits to the political branches, our political life is full of them."18 9 While
not all agree with this approach,19 one can nevertheless respond to an
attempted justification of the total abstention model by means of the politi-
cal question analogy by questioning the legitimacy of that doctrine, to the
extent it represents something more than substantive constitutional inter-
pretation of the allocation of authority among the branches. If the judici-
ary declines to resolve sensitive disputes, the nation is effectively left in a
constitutional state of nature, and the constitutional position that prevails
will be the one that is politically or physically most powerful.
In any event, obvious differences separate the political question doctrine
from the total abstention model. Unlike the total abstention model, the
political question doctrine does not have the effect of repealing a specific
jurisdictional grant. For the political question doctrine to result in an
analogous usurpation of legislative authority, Congress would have to
have enacted a statute that did nothing more than vest jurisdiction in the
federal courts to adjudicate political questions. In such a case, the legiti-
mate criticism of the political question doctrine would probably increase.
Moreover, the political question doctrine does not undermine a carefully
structured legislative scheme in which the federal courts play an impor-
tant role. In the context of legislative-judicial disputes, the political ques-
tion doctrine could conceivably be justified as a means of avoiding usurpa-
tion of congressional authority. While the total abstention model
represents a judicial refusal to enforce substantive congressional legislation
against state action, the political question doctrine constitutes a judicial
refusal to challenge the exercise of congressional authority. Thus, though
one might raise a separation-of-powers objection to the political question
doctrine, it would be because of the judiciary's refusal to consider the con-
stitutionality of an exercise of legislative authority. This is hardly the
usurpation of legislative authority represented by the total abstention
model.
CONCLUSION
Judge-made abstention constitutes judicial lawmaking of the most
sweeping nature. Although a federal court's decision to infer a private
cause of action may arguably invade the legislative process, judge-made
abstention presents a considerably greater risk of judicial usurpation.
While judicial creation of private rights of action can undermine a care-
189. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 598-99 (1976).
190. See Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Ter-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 46 (1961).
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fully structured statutory goal only indirectly, judicial lawmaking through
abstention can very directly undermine that goal.
Recognition that abstention amounts to judicial lawmaking shifts the
focus of the abstention debate away from the comparative merits of the
policies for and against the various forms of abstention and toward the
issue of the institutional legitimacy of such action on the part of the judici-
ary. Well accepted principles of separation of powers mandate that an
electorally accountable legislature make the basic policy decisions concern-
ing how the nation is to be governed. The authority to make these policy
decisions necessarily includes the authority to employ the federal judiciary
to enforce the substantive statutory programs adopted by Congress. Absent
a finding of unconstitutionality, it is not the judiciary's function to modify
or repeal a congressional enforcement network unless Congress has clearly
delegated such authority to the judiciary. No court or commentator has
presented persuasive evidence of any congressional intent to delegate such
authority. Indeed, throughout the nation's history, Congress has retained
for itself the authority to decide when federal courts should decline to
exercise their jurisdiction.
It may well be that, if Congress were to consider the matter today, it
would choose to structure abstention much as the federal courts have. But
the comparative arguments for and against such forms of abstention are
by no means so one-sided as to make that conclusion inescapable. In a
constitutional democracy, in any event, such decisions are most appropri-
ately rendered by the legislature, not the judiciary.
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